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Future Stability in the European 
Union: Realism, Constructivism, and 
Institutionalism
Maya Swisa
INTRODUCTION
After experiencing the devastation of WWI and WWII within Europe’s borders, Eu-
ropean citizens and statesmen sought a way to prevent war from re-emerging on European 
soil. As a result, they formed a European community to act as a safeguard against war. As 
the European Union (EU) developed over the last sixty years, membership has expanded to 
twenty-seven states and no full-scale war has emerged within EU borders. However, realists 
argue that states face constant security threats and cannot escape the possibility of war as 
a result of the security dilemma and the uneven distribution of power in the international 
system. Thus, the question arises: do EU member states still have the potential to go to war 
against one another in the future? In this paper, I examine realist, constructivist, and insti-
tutionalist perspectives on the issue and assess which theory best explains present stability 
among EU member states. I do not seek to promote policy prescriptions for the EU. Instead, 
I simply try to evaluate the different theoretical approaches and consider which approach 
best explains the probability of maintaining long-standing peace within the EU. Ultimately, 
I conclude that, despite criticisms of the neo-liberal institutionalist perspective, the theory is 
most applicable for predicting the future stability in the EU.
I begin this paper with a description of the realist perspective, focusing on John J. 
Mearsheimer’s prediction of the conditions that prevent or enable peace within the EU. I 
then point out that, in the case of the EU, realism poses several problems: it is pessimistic in 
nature; it ignores the role of institutional mechanisms and norms; and it only recognizes states 
as the main actors in influencing the international system. In the following section, I exam-
ine the constructivist explanations focusing on the role of norms, identity, and socialization 
as driving actions in the European Union. I then expand upon a major flaw in constructivist 
theory: it lacks the ability to explain why agents may or may not be successful in changing 
norms over time and what makes these norms stick. In the next section, I inspect the neo-
liberal institutionalist theory proposed by Bruce Russett, John Oneal, and Michael Berbaum 
based on the Kantian theory of peace. I show that neo-liberal institutionalist theory poses a 
problem because it does not address the role of short-term relative gains, which is an impor-
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tant component of realist theory. Ultimately, I find that the neo-liberal institutionalist theory 
best explains future stability in the European Union because it encompasses elements of both 
realism and institutionalism. 
REALISM
Realism assumes that states are the main actors in the international system. Because 
states are merely trying to survive in the anarchic system, they will act based on self-interest 
or raison d’etat as a guiding principle in their relations with other states (Walt, 1998). Accord-
ing to realism, states are in a constant state of war. The root causes of war and peace stem from 
the distribution and character of military power (Mearsheimer, 1990). John J. Mearsheimer 
(1990), a proponent of offensive realism in the neo-realist approach, predicts instability in 
Europe with the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a multipolar system. Because 
the realist paradigm focuses on the virtue of state sovereignty and power, realists do not 
predict that states will cede sovereignty to a supra-national power and cannot explain the 
continued existence of the European Union. Because the EU poses somewhat of a conun-
drum to most realists, so few realists have attempted to apply realist theory to explain EU 
actions. Accordingly, this paper takes Mearsheimer’s offensive realism as representing the 
overall realist perspective for the future of EU security since Mearsheimer is the only realist 
who has attempted to apply realism to the case of Europe. Mearsheimer (1990) attributes the 
relative peace in Europe during the Cold War era to three key factors: “the bipolar distribu-
tion of military power on the Continent; the rough military equality between the two states 
comprising the poles in Europe, the United States and the Soviet Union; and the fact that 
each superpower was armed with a large nuclear arsenal” (pp. 6-7). Now that these systemic 
mechanisms are no longer in place, he argues that instability within Europe will increase, 
and the chances are higher that European states could go to war with one another. While 
Mearsheimer points to the importance of safeguarding the three systemic mechanisms, he 
also points to a more minor threat to European stability—hyper-nationalism. Mearsheimer 
(1990) argues that hyper-nationalism is attributed to the emergence of past wars in Europe 
and will be a factor in the emergence of future wars.
Bipolarity occurs when the distribution of power in the international system is domi-
nated by two major powers as poles. In contrast, multipolarity involves three or more domi-
nant powers as poles (Mearsheimer, 1990). According to some realists, bipolarity increases 
stability and peace because there are fewer possible conflict dyads to emerge between com-
peting poles. Additionally, bipolarity makes deterrence more feasible because fewer imbal-
ances in the power structure provide a stronger foundation for deterrence to take place 
(Mearsheimer, 1990). In order for deterrence to be effective, both sides must have roughly 
equal capabilities in order to prevent the use of weapons or military forces against one an-
other. Furthermore, within the confines of a bipolar system, “prospects for deterrence are 
greater because miscalculations of relative power and of opponents’ resolve are fewer and less 
likely” (Mearsheimer, 1990). Therefore, the prediction assumes that if multipolarity should 
emerge in the international system and include certain EU member states (e.g. Germany, the 
United Kingdom, France, and possibly Italy (Mearsheimer, 1990)) as poles, the likelihood 
of war and instability within the EU will be much higher than the Cold War bipolarity. 
However, some realists say that multipolarity is more stable than bipolarity (Morgenthau & 
Thompson, 1993). Thus, even within realism there is no consensus on the best system for 
ensuring stability.
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During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union comprised the two poles. 
It is important to note that since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, it has generally been accepted that the present international system is defined by uni-
polarity, with the United States dominating as the major pole (Wohlforth, 1999). Therefore, 
the EU member states have neither emerged as poles in a multipolar system, nor witnessed 
the emergence of a multipolar system since the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, there 
also seems to be a general consensus that the US’ dominance in the international system is 
diminishing and a multipolar international system will soon emerge. Some scholars say that 
the EU has certain characteristics that define it as a superpower (Moravcsik, 2010) – yet, 
even in this situation, individual EU member states are not competing against each other 
for power. Because the international system is very complex, now that the US is no longer 
regarded as a clear hegemon, some also point to China as a new emerging superpower (Fish-
man, 2005). Ultimately, Mearsheimer’s theory has yet to be put to the test.
Additionally, Mearsheimer (1990) places virtue on nuclear deterrence as the most ef-
fective method of deterrence because the costs and risks of nuclear warfare are so obvious 
and vast. Thus, the idea is that “the more horrible the risk of going to war, the less likely it is 
to occur” (Mearsheimer, 1990, p. 19). If states continue to build up their nuclear capabilities, 
they reduce the risk of war by increasing the costs of war. However, despite Mearsheimer’s 
prediction, the EU “has identified the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as ‘po-
tentially the greatest threat’ to its security” (Anthony et al., 2010). Therefore, because the EU 
condemns active pursuit of nuclear proliferation, I doubt that member states will employ 
nuclear deterrence as a mechanism to ensure peace.
Lastly, Mearsheimer (1990) argues that hyper-nationalism has not been present within 
the EU during the Cold War era but was a major factor in the eruption of the previous 
wars in Europe and has the potential to increase its scope in Europe in the future. Hyper-
nationalism encompasses the “belief that other nations or nation-states are both inferior and 
threatening and must therefore be dealt with harshly” (Mearsheimer, 1990, p. 21). It would 
appear that the appearance of hyper-nationalism at the member state level could pose a 
threat to security within the EU. In a recent speech in Berlin, Herman Von Rompuy (2010), 
President of the European Council, warned of the potential dangers of nationalism to the 
European Union. He stated, 
“the biggest enemy of Europe is fear. Fear leads to egoism, egoism leads to na-
tionalism, and nationalism leads to war (“le nationalisme, c’est la guerre” (F. Mit-
terand)). Today’s nationalism is often not a feeling of pride of one’s own identity, 
but a negative feeling of apprehension of others.”
However, while Von Rompuy (2010) maintains that the rise of hyper-nationalist ten-
dencies still remains a significant threat to stability in the European Union, there is little 
evidence that hyper-nationalist groups take up more than a small minority of citizens within 
the EU. Thus, the hyper-nationalism is not widespread enough to legitimately threaten peace 
and stability within the European Union. 
Problems with Realism
There are several problems with realism in terms of its pessimistic nature, its disregard 
for norms and institutions, and its emphasis on states as the most important actors in the 
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international system. First, it is important to note that realism reflects worst-case scenario 
thinking. While an optimist can be defined as “a person who says this is the best of all pos-
sible worlds,” (Russett et al., 1990, p. 216) a pessimist can also be defined in the same way. 
Mearsheimer’s realist solutions qualify as pessimistic. Additionally, many of these solutions, 
which include nuclear proliferation and bipolarity, work as self-fulfilling prophecies. This 
relies on the premise that “if we act as though the world is an arena of raw struggle, red in 
tooth and claw, we can surely make it so” (Russett et al. 1990, p. 216). 
Furthermore, realists disregard the role of institutions and ideologies in the interna-
tional system and instead emphasize that “only the ‘realities’ of power competition matter” 
(Russett et al. 1990, p. 216). Under this assumption, how states govern themselves and how 
their adversaries govern themselves does not affect the prospects of avoiding war (Russett et 
al. 1990, p. 216). However, in looking at the Cold War, differing forms of government and 
governing ideologies played a huge role in prompting war. Furthermore, the theory does 
not bestow any importance on the institutions set up by the European Union. Some argue 
that implementing institutional mechanisms has helped the EU in averting full-scale war 
since the end of WWII in addition to keeping norms of cooperation and integration in place 
(Russett et al. 1990).
Much of the realist argument regarding the threat of multipolarity in Europe relies on 
the assumption that certain European countries like “Germany, France, Britain, and perhaps 
Italy would assume major power status” (Mearsheimer, 1990, p.7). Although it could be ar-
gued that some of those countries are stronger powers because of their advantages in GDP 
and population size (Central Intelligence Agency, 2010), the EU is designed so that these 
countries do not receive any preferential treatment of power status. Because of the emphasis 
on unanimity and compromise within the Council, each member state has an equal say on 
EU issues for the most part. Furthermore, because of the integration of EU member-states 
into an inter-governmental organization able to speak with one voice (“Treaty of Lisbon 
(The treaty at a glance)”), some see the EU emerging as a great power in international poli-
tics. This poses a problem to the realist argument, which only recognizes states as legitimate 
actors. 
CONSTRUCTIVISM
Constructivism serves as an umbrella theory for many sub-theories. In general, con-
structivists tend to be concerned with how international politics are socially constructed 
(Wendt, 1995). Wendt (1995) states that this construction “involves two basic claims: that 
the fundamental structures of international politics are social rather than strictly material (a 
claim that opposes materialism), and that these structures shape actors’ identities and interests, 
rather than just their behavior” (pp.71-2). Non-material social factors like ideas, identities, 
and norms remain the driving forces in determining state actions. However, constructivists 
argue that norms drive actions and not vice versa. Norms, in effect, constitute actor identities 
and interests. In this sense, norms do more than simply regulate behavior. They help to es-
tablish and define a base for the structural system in place. “For constructivists, agents (states) 
and structures (global norms) are interacting; they are mutually constituted” (Checkel, 1998, 
pp. 327-8). The structure of the international system rests on the formation and dispersion 
of norms. 
According to Jeffrey T. Checkel (2001), the social interaction between actors plays a 
pivotal role in applying constructivist theory to the EU. Social interaction is defined as “a 
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process during which agent interests, and perhaps identities, change” (p. 220). In looking at 
the emergence of the EU from a historical perspective, it was founded on the basis of secu-
rity concerns. The initial creation of the EU signified a shift in security norms. The unifica-
tion of European countries aimed at “ending the frequent and bloody wars between neigh-
bors, which culminated in the Second World War” (“The History of the European Union”). 
There was a shift from norms of competition, separation, and heightened state nationalism 
to norms of cooperation, integration, and peace building. Additionally, through socialization, 
which is how norms are spread, other norms such as compromise and deliberation have 
emerged over time, helping to further integration in the EU (Checkel & Moravcsik, 2001).
The initial shift resulted in changing attitudes toward security policy for European 
states. The security policy changed because “the normative desire to put an end to war pro-
vided a motive for experimentation, and over the years, conflict managing strategies have 
been employed” (Hermann & Brewer, 2004, p. 1). Member states sought peaceful solutions 
as opposed to war-oriented solutions. Their focus became maintaining friendly relations 
amongst one another. Peace emerged as a norm crucial to European security. Although it 
took over fifty years to achieve a common security policy for the EU, member states were 
able to uphold peace without an official security policy in effect. Furthermore, language and 
communication have played central roles in maintaining EU peace and cooperation without 
a hard policy in place. Processes of argumentation and learning characterize the social inter-
action that occurs within the EU. Similarly, “deliberation may transform the very interests of 
state agents in supranational settings at the EU level” (Checkel & Moravcsik, 2001, p. 221). 
Because member states are able to discuss issues in a non-threatening environment, not only 
do they learn to work together and cooperate, but they also learn more in terms of individual 
states’ interests and needs.
Whereas realism places an emphasis on material factors and the role of states, construc-
tivism emphasizes the importance of ideational factors. In this case, the initial shift of Euro-
pean security norms led to the gradual emergence of a European identity, which strengthens 
as European cooperation and integration become more prevalent. Over the years, the mem-
ber states have continued to establish institutions and laws that push for European integration 
and unity. Norms of cooperation and common identity have driven EU policy. Because the 
notion of a European identity became a prominent element of integration, EU policymakers 
encouraged the removal of state lines to ensure the free movement of people and goods in 
the Schengen Agreement (“The Schengena area and cooperation”). One could look at the 
emergence of a common European identity as an integral component in implementing the 
Schengen Agreement. 
Instead of acting as a supra-nationalistic identity to compete with individual state iden-
tities, the EU identity works to complement national identities. “People can feel as part of 
both communities without having to choose a primary identification” (Risse, 2004, p. 248). 
Furthermore, the EU institutions would not be able to influence European citizens if they 
did not identify somewhat with the EU as a whole. Thomas Risse (2004) wrote, 
Willingness to grant EU authority requires some identification with Europe, but 
not an identification that actually prioritizes Europe over the nation… the Eu-
ropean polity does not require a demos that replaces a national with a European 
identity, but one in which national and European identities coexist and comple-
ment each other (p. 250).
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 The EU avoids fostering competing national identities, which could lead to hyper-
nationalism and war, by utilizing a complementary approach. European citizens do not have 
to worry about competing with other state nationalities, nor do they have to worry about 
competition between their own nationality and a single European nationality. This blending 
of national ties helps to avoid potential conflicting identities and reduce the threat of height-
ened hyper-nationalism described by realists. 
Problems with Constructivism
Even if all Europeans believed war to be obsolete, there is always the possibility that 
the EU’s norms for peace and cooperation could change if they were somehow no longer 
beneficial to the individual states. Critics argue that constructivism “is not able to explain in 
a systematic way how social construction actually occurs and why it varies cross-nationally” 
(Checkel, 1998, p. 339). There is one exception to this criticism—Martha Finnemore and 
Kathryn Sikkink (1998) came up with a “life-cycle” methodology to constructivism. Many 
constructivist theories tend to be context-specific, lacking a theoretical rationalization as to 
the specific processes under which social construction occurs (Checkel, 1998). The theory 
does not explain what necessary social mechanisms must be in place in order to maintain 
EU’s norms and identities. Also, it lacks the ability to predict when and how norms will 
emerge and change. There is no way of knowing if EU’s movement towards peace and 
cooperation is guaranteed to last. Ultimately, constructivism cannot predict peace because 
the theory is weak in explaining agency – i.e. why agents may or may not be successful in 
changing norms over time and what makes these norms stick. 
INSTITUTIONALISM
While constructivism focuses on the role of norms, ideas, and socialization in driving 
state actions and realism focuses on building up hard power capabilities and states’ distribu-
tion of power within the anarchic system, institutionalism focuses on the role that institu-
tions play in affecting states’ behavior within the anarchic international system. In recent 
years, neo-liberal institutionalism has emerged as a practical theory within the realm of 
institutionalism. Grieco (1988) says that “the new liberal institutionalists basically argue that 
even if the realists are correct in believing that anarchy constrains the willingness of states 
to cooperate, states nevertheless can work together and can do so with the aid of interna-
tional institutions” (p. 486). Based on the idea of the Kantian Theory of Peace, Bruce Russett, 
John Oneal, and Michael Berbaum (2003) have offered a neo-liberal institutionalist theory 
proposing that democracy, economic interdependence, and international organizations (IOs) 
are key ingredients for peaceful cooperation. Founder of Kantian theory of peace, Immanuel 
Kant “suggests that international peace could be established on a foundation of three ele-
ments: republican constitutions, “cosmopolitan law” embodied in free trade and economic 
interdependence, and international law and organizations” (Oneal et al., 2003, p. 372). Oneal 
et al. (2003) have taken Kant’s theory and applied it to the modern international system. For 
purposes of simplicity, I will refer to Russett, Oneal, and Berbaum’s theory as ‘triangulating 
peace.’
The theory not only addresses the components of democratic peace, but it also en-
compasses a rationalist and neo-liberal perspective. Triangulating peace theory corresponds 
to neo-liberalism, which argues that “institutions matter because they somehow modify the 
actions of decision-makers both directly by altering the costs and benefits of actions and by 
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indirectly modifying goals (of cooperation)” (Niou & Ordeshook, 1991, p. 481-2). States 
utilize rational self-interest to weigh the costs and benefits of liberalizing trade markets. More 
benefits lead to economic interdependence. As rational actors, states will cooperate when 
issues of predictability and absolute gains are addressed. Triangulating peace aims to increase 
predictability by implementing institutional regulations, which obligate all states to adhere 
to the same rules. Furthermore, with a reduced probability of the outbreak of war and use 
of force, states will be more willing to engage in trade with other countries, which also in-
creases elements of predictability. Theory deals with rationalism because in terms of absolute 
gains, triangulating peace asserts that states are more reluctant to trade with adversaries. They 
tend to focus on relative gains when dealing with an adversarial party. However, when states 
trade with cooperative partners, “it is the absolute gains accruing to the trading partners that 
primarily motivate their behavior… relative gains should rarely impede trade” (Oneal et al., 
2003, p. 374). Therefore, in addition to maintaining the underpinnings of democratic peace, 
the triangulating peace theory takes on a rationalist, neo-liberal perspective.
In triangulating peace, there is a direct relationship between peace and the three com-
ponents: democracy, IOs, and economic interdependence. The authors analyzed 10,000 cases 
from 1885-1992 and concluded that if all three factors are increased simultaneously, “the 
probability of a dispute drops by 71 percent” (Oneal et al. 2003, p. 373). The peace triangle 
works in a virtuous cycle; democracy affects the triangle in that:
The leaders of democratic states are constrained from resorting to force against 
other democracies; but democracy, by encouraging individual liberty and respon-
sibility, fosters entrepreneurship and the expansion of commerce beyond a na-
tion’s boundaries. As the economic activities of citizens make countries interde-
pendent, international law and organizations are needed to regulate and facilitate 
commerce. Thus, there is a logical sequence that links the freedom of citizens in 
democratic states to expanding commerce over a widening geographical area and 
the growth of international institutions (Oneal et al., 2003, p. 383).
When a democracy is put into place, conflict is less likely and there is a higher likeli-
hood that citizens will pursue economic interdependence, which eventually requires in-
ternational law and organizations to smooth the progress of interdependence. Trade and 
conflict are also similarly interrelated. Entrepreneurs are less willing to engage in economic 
trade with states that face instability due to conflict. Furthermore, if “the use of force is no 
longer an issue, then a state’s relative loss will not be turned against the state. Relative gains 
no longer matter and cooperation becomes feasible” (Oneal et al. 2003, p. 374). Additionally, 
“militarized disputes, disrupt trade, which is why interdependent states avoid them” (Oneal 
et al., 2003, p. 388). Therefore, interdependence is less likely during times of conflict. States 
are more likely to establish interdependence with other states that they have good political 
relations with.
While states are more willing to enter into a conflict with a trade partner when the po-
tential risks are high and uncertain because they have less to lose, international organizations 
provide institutional mechanisms like trade agreements, which help establish rule of law to 
counter variables of uncertainty. Additionally, “democracies and interdependent states may 
benefit from being able to communicate their preferences by sending costly signals… states 
joined in well-institutionalized IGOs (inter-governmental organizations) can use those or-
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ganizations to exchange information and credibly communicate resolve” (Oneal et al., 2003, 
p. 382). International organizations facilitate states’ cooperation by effectively communicat-
ing their preferences without resorting to military measures. Instead, economic and political 
diplomatic measures gain importance and credibility.
The EU Copenhagen Criteria follows the triangulating peace model. In order to join 
the EU, a member state must meet certain criteria in three areas. First, the state must have 
stable institutions that guarantee democracy along with the rule of law, human rights and 
respect for protection of minorities. Second, a state must possess a functioning market that 
can readily be integrated into the EU market and be able to adapt to competitive pressure 
and market forces within the EU market. Third, under the provision of acquis communautaire a 
state must show its ability to take on the obligations of membership to the European Union, 
which includes adherence to the aims of political, economic, and monetary union (“Glossa-
ry: Accession criteria”). In summary, a state must embody democracy and democratic values, 
be prepared to integrate into an interdependent economic market, and be willing to take on 
membership into an international organization—the European Union. 
Some may not view the EU as an international organization like the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) or the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
Instead, the EU is a supra-national oriented governing body with hundreds of laws, multiple 
governing institutions, and too much influence over the member-states and their citizens to 
simply be categorized as an IO. Despite the laws established under the umbrella of the EU, 
states still remain sovereign entities with the ability to leave the EU whenever they please 
(“Treaty of Lisbon (Treaty at a glance)”) although in practice, no state has expressed a serious 
desire to leave the EU. Furthermore, while the EU does not have a constitution to govern its 
citizens, EU law takes precedence over national law, and member states have given up sov-
ereignty in a number of policy areas. Thus, member states are bound to the EU in a similar 
way that citizens are bound to a state. Their obligation to the EU resembles something in 
between obligation to an IO and obligation to a state. However, the case of the EU can still 
work as an international organization in the way that Oneal et al. (2003) suppose because 
regardless of its categorization, member states place more importance on the EU than other 
IOs. 
Problems with Neo-liberal institutionalism
There are a number of shortcomings with this approach. The theory assumes that states 
will choose to pursue prosperity over survival. The question of short-term relative gains is 
glossed over because it loses its importance when factoring in long-term absolute gains. By 
making this assumption, the theory does not address what will happen if a state does not 
benefit from economic prosperity in terms of short-term relative gains. The theory supposes 
that if a state does not benefit from any short-term relative gains, it will be willing to sacrifice 
these short-term gains for long-term absolute gains. The theory assumes that states choose 
to pursue long-term prosperity over short-term survival. Realists might not agree with this 
point because they argue that survival is the basis for states’ rational, self-interested decision-
making, which often points to short-term oriented goals. If each member state is competing 
for security, decision-makers will look at what best serves the state individually, without nec-
essarily considering long-term absolute gains (Mearsheimer, 1990). In this case, if a state no 
longer benefits from integration, it will remove itself from interdependence and cooperation. 
However, I believe that in the case of the EU, the benefits of long-term prosperity outweigh 
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those of short-term gains. While it could also be argued that the institutional mechanisms 
put in place provide incentives to ensure that the state benefits more from cooperation than 
individual pursuit, the theory does not specifically address what happens if one state does not 
benefit from economic prosperity, which Oneal et al. (2003) argue could deter a state from 
embarking on peaceful relations (Mearsheimer, 1990). It instead assumes that it will not be 
an issue and a state will take on a mentality where what is best for all is best for the individual. 
However, it is important to note that the theory does assume that norms, culture, and 
historical ties that emerge from establishing democratic institutions, participating in eco-
nomic interdependence, and maintaining IO membership will feed state preferences toward 
long-term cooperation. This element reflects the role of constructivism within neo-liberal 
institutionalism. Furthermore, the neo-liberal institutionalist theory addresses the problem 
of relative gains by concluding that it is in the rational self-interest of states to participate in 
economic interdependence and cooperation, despite short-term relative losses. Overall, in 
the long run, EU member states have benefited in terms of absolute gains compared to their 
economic positions right after WWII. 
CONCLUSION: NEO-LIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM AS THE BEST EXPLANATION
Neo-liberal institutionalism encompasses ideas from both realist and constructivist 
theories. Like realism, it addresses the role of anarchy in the international system as a driv-
ing force for state actions. Additionally, triangulating peace includes a long-term oriented 
rationalist perspective. Like constructivism, neo-liberal institutionalism also emphasizes the 
role of norms in maintaining security. While institutions keep the norms in place and remain 
strong embodiments of norms, they also help ensure that self-interest is safeguarded. In look-
ing at the realist and constructivist theories, each theory alone cannot sufficiently explain 
stability in the EU. However, realism and constructivism do account for part of the story. 
While each theory plays a role in triangulating peace, it is the three mechanisms: democracy, 
economic interdependence, and membership in an international organization that remain 
most integral to maintaining peaceful cooperation.
REFERENCES 
Anthony, I., Grand, C., Kulesa, L., Molling, C., & Smith, M. (2010). Nuclear weapons after 
the 2010 NPT review conference. European Union Institute for Security Studies 
Central Intelligence Agency. (2010). The World Factbook. Washington, DC: United States 
Government. Retrieved from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/region/region_eur.html>. 
Checkel, J. T., (1998). The constructivist turn in international relations theory. World Politics, 
50(2), 324-48.
Checkel, J. T., & Moravcsik, A. (2001). A constructivist research program in EU studies? Eu-
ropean Union Politics, 2(2), 219-49. 
Communication Department of the European Commission. The History of the European 
Union. Brussels: European Union. Retrieved from http://europa.eu/abc/history/in-
dex_en.htm.
Communication Department of the European Commission. Treaty of Lisbon (The treaty at 
a glance). Brussels: European Union. Retrieved from http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/
glance/index_en.htm
Communication Department of the European Commission. The Schengen area and coop-
133
Future Stability in the European Union
eration. Brussels: European Union. Retrieved from http://europa.eu/legislation_sum-
maries/justice_freedom_security/free_movement_of_persons_asylum_immigration/
l33020_en.htm
Finnemore, M., & Sikkink, K. (1998). International norm dynamics and political change. 
International Organization, 52(4), 887-917.
Fishman, T. C. (2005). China, Inc.: How the Rise of the Next Superpower Challenges America and 
the World. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Grieco, J. M. (1988). Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: A realist critique of the newest 
liberal institutionalism. International Organization, 42(3), 485-507. 
Hermann, R., & Brewer, M. B. (2004). Identities and institutions: Becoming European in the 
EU. In M. Brewer (Ed.), Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU. (pp. 1-22). 
Rowmann & Littlefield. 
Mearsheimer, J. J. (1990). Back to the future: Instability in Europe after the cold war. Interna-
tional Security, 15(1), 5-56. 
Moravcsik, A. (2010, March). Europe, the second superpower. Current History, 91-98.
Morgenthau, H. J., & Thompson, K. W. (1993). Politics among Nations: the Struggle for Power and 
Peace. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Niou, E. M. S., & Ordeshook, P. C. (1991). Realism versus neoliberalism: A formulation. 
American Journal of Political Science, 35(2), 481-511.
Oneal, J. R., Russett, B., & Berbaum, M. L. (2003). Causes of opeace: Democracy, interde-
pendence, and international organizations, 1885-1992. International Studies Quarterly, 
47(3), 371-393. 
Risse, T. (2004). European institutions and identity change: What have we learned? In M. 
Brewer (Ed.), Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU. (pp. 247-272). Row-
mann & Littlefield.
Russett, B. M., Risse-Kappen, T., & Mearsheimer, J. J. (1990) Back to the future, part III: 
Realism and the realities of European security. International Security, 15(3), 216-222.
Von Rompuy, H. (2010, November 9). “A Curtain Went Up.” Berliner Europa-Rede, Per-
gamon Museum. Berlin, Germany.
Walt, S. M. (1998). International relations: One world, many theories. Foreign Policy, 110, 
29-32, 34-46.
Wendt, A. (1995). Constructing international politics. International Security, 20(1), 71-81.
Wohlforth, W. C. (1999). The stability of a unipolar world. International Security, 24(1), 5-41. 
Maya Swisa University of Southern California134
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2011/iss1/11
